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Summary findings
Before East Asia's financial meltdown in the second half  But policies emphasizing greater competition and a
of 1997, there appeared to be prospects for an uneasy  level playing field - implicitly thought to require less
consensus on the East Asian "miracle," a consensus that  government action - may require more government
recognized the role of the entrepreneurial state in  expertise, not less. If implementing a 10 percent export
accelerating industrial development but emphasized the  subsidy is difficult, consider the difficulty of determining
"market-friendly" nature of the state's interventions.  whether a firm is exercising market power or restraining
After the financial crisis, East Asian policies and  trade.  So the prospect of governments stepping back may
institutions are once again under scrutiny  -for  their  be unrealistic.
failures rather  than for their miracles.  The new consensus also proposes "deep integration,"
Mody finds that the prospects for a consensus that  or the adoption of uniform standards in such areas as
incorporated the East Asian experience were ill founded.  competition policy and labor and environmental
East Asian policymakers ernphasized grows  th through  standards.
quantitative targets; price signals played a significant but  For East Asia, the shift to the international consensus
secondary role.  may be appropriate because government-driven growth
Mody illustrates these propositions by examining trade  has declined in intellectual respectability. Also, it may be
policy, industrial conglomerates, and the provision of  time to consolidate the gains from the rapid trade-led
physical infrastructure.  growth by focusing on creating a stronger incentive
The evolving international consensus on industrial  structure for efficiently using resources.
policy, which predates the Asian crisis, emphasizes a  The current consensus is based on strong priors rather
hands-off approach in which an activist government  than on solid empirical evidence, however, and the
plays a reduced role and competition policy plays an  dangers of international uniformity in policy are evident.
important role.
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Just when views on East Asia's economic  "miracle"  appeared  to be converging,  the East
Asians  chose  once again  to surprise  the world-this time  by spiraling  into a financial
meltdown. The publication  ofthe World Bank's (1993)  EastAsianMiracle had added
respectability  to East Asian  industrial  policy. Even critics  of the "Miracle"  study  welcomed  the
belated  and qualified  recognition  of the role that the state had played  in fostering  industrial
growth.' Is there reason  now to reassess  one more  time,  the lessons  from East Asia?
I review  three sets of East Asian  policies:  those related  to trade, corporate
organization,  and physical  infrastructure  provision.  East Asian  policymakers  used these
complementary  policy  instruments  primarily  to stimulate  output growth  or relieve  bottlenecks.
The East Asian experience  can be characterized  a "big  industrial  push"  tempered  by price and
international  market discipline  to limit  egregious  errors. This interpretation  is consistent  with
estimates  of modest  productivity  growth  in the region.  East Asian  growth depended  on the
virtuous  reinforcement  of policy  measures  and  business  behavior  that always  had the potential
to unravel,  although  the timing  was unpredictable.
Thus, despite  East Asia's evident  success  in achieving  high  rates of investment  and
output growth, and notwithstanding  the "Miracle"  study,  I conclude  that East Asia  offers few
lessons  to guide  industrial  policy  in the near  future-either for itself or for other countries.
This view  had begun  to evolve  prior to and independent  of the recent crisis  but has been
reinforced  by the financial  distress  in the East Asian  region. Government  interventions  to
stimulate  industrial  growth  will not disappear  but the emphasis  has shifted  towards measures
1 For example,  Rodrik  (1997)  writes:  "Whatever  one may say about  the World  Bank (1993)  East  Asian Miracle
report, this study  has made it very  difficult  for any reasonable  person to argue that there was little government
intervention  in East Asian  countries,  or that these countries  grew so fast despite  their government's
interventions,-arguments  that one  used to hear not infrequently."2
that deal directly  with increasing  efficiency  (e.g., competition  policy  and definition  and
protection  of property  rights).
Selective  industrial  targeting  may  be dated,  but surely  the importance  of "outward-
orientation"  remains  undiminished? 2 Though  a hallowed  tenet in the explanation  of the East
Asian miracle,  the term "outward-orientation"  tends  to be a fluid  one (absence  of bias against
exports,  active  promotion  of exports,  and low  trade barriers). When  defined  as low trade
barriers  to increase  an economy's  allocative  efficiency,  outward  orientation  has been driven  by
an intellectual  tradition  beyond  East Asia. East Asian economies  are often  thought  to validate
the benefits  of"openness,"  but their commitment  to low  tariff and non-tariff  barriers  has been
less than exemplary. Also, aggressive  export  promotion  from East Asia  has been  viewed  with
concern  by the international  community-countervailing  duties,  antidumping  measures,
"voluntary"  export restraints  are instruments  designed  to limit  the advantages  from government
support of exporters. 3
East Asia's corporate  structure  and governance  mechanisms-significant  contributors
to rapid output growth in the past-are  under especially  strong  criticism  in the wake  of the
ongoing  financial  crisis. Close  relationships  between  government  and business,  heavy  reliance
on bank debt, and conglomerate  firms  combined  to foster  corporate  investment  in highly
efficient  factories,  new product  development,  and greater presence  in international  markets.
That system  is under criticism  for "cronyism"  and wasteful  investments  in real estate and
2 The IMF (1997)  in referring  to high East Asian growth  rates in the first half of the 1990s-high even  by the
standards  of that region-attributes them principally  to "outward-orientation."
3 Since the onset of the recent  crisis,  falling East Asian  export  revenues  (in dollars)  despite rising export
volumes  are also  a reminder  that manufactured  exports,  like  primary  comunodities,  can experience  sharp
decline  in prices,  contributing  to an adverse  shift  in terms of trade. The competitive  currency  devaluations  in
the region revive  the concerns  of "export  pessimists"  of yesteryears  that the world  market  does not have  the
depth to absorb  large  volumes  of developing  country  exports  without  a significant  price decrease. Raphie
Kaplinsky  (1998) shows  most developing  economies  have  experienced  steadily  declining  terms of trade
especially  since  the emergence  of China as a significant  exporter  of manufactured  goods.3
currency  speculation. 4 The knife-edge  quality  of the corporate  governance  mechanism  in East
Asia  was evident  to observers  (Campos  and  Root 1996)  and reform  attempts  were ongoing
even prior to the recent crisis. The limited  progress  in dismantling  old structures  reflects  not
only the decline  in the East Asian  states' ability  to enforce  policies  but is also a reminder  of the
continued  economic  strengths  of the region's business  organizations.
Finally,  a generally  untold feature  of East Asia's success  has been  the large and steady
commitment  to the provision  of infrastructure,  sometimes  built ahead  of demand  but typically
to relieve  bottlenecks  in the flow of people,  goods, and  information  to permit  rapid growth.
Despite  its past success,  the public  delivery  system  is giving  way  to greater  use of private
initiative  and capital  in the provision  of infrastructure.  To serve  future requirements,  the
system  will need  to shift  from an emphasis  on physical  targets to financial  and regulatory
mechanisms  that create incentives  for efficient  delivery  while  protecting  the consumer.
This paper is guided  by the idea  that imbalances  in an economic  system  periodically
cause shifts  in focus (see Syrquin  1986). The worldwide  decline  of trade barriers  requires
government  policies  to pay greater  attention  to domestic  non-tradable  inputs  and institutions.
Participation  in the global  economy  is held  back by the absence  of key non-tradable  inputs.
Specifically,  improved  productivity  of non-tradable  inputs  such  as infrastructure  become  of
critical  importance;  equally,  important  are the institutions  and the bureaucracy  that deliver  a
domestic  policy  agenda  with emphasis  on a competitive  environment  while  protecting  property
rights.
In turn, the domestic  policy  agenda  is partly  being  preempted  by the efforts  to create
international  standards  for "best practice"  in policymaking.  New sets of rules for "deep"
4 In 1996,  Astra,  the Indonesian  conglomerate,  made  Rp 80 billion of its Rp 90 billion net profit  by borrowing
abroad  and lending at higher domestic  interest rates (Financial  Times,  September  11, 1998). Though  among
the strongest  Indonesian  firms, Astra has had to reschedule  its foreign  debt: "There is no way it can repay its4
integration-as distinct  from the "shallow"  integration  achieved  by freer flows  of trade-are
being  put in place. These rules seek to increase  competition  and create a more "level  playing
field"  and deal  with competition  policy,  intellectual  property,  environment  and labor  standards,
investment  codes, and more liberal  trade in services  such  as telecommunications.  This set of
policies  is acquiring  increasing  homogeneity  across  national  borders in part because  of
endorsement  by international  institutions  and, in some  cases,  actual codification  in the
framework  of the World Trade Organization  (WTO).
In the next  three sections,  I consider  the East Asian  experience  with trade policy,
corporate  structure,  and infrastructure  delivery. I then describe  the trend towards the
international  homogenization  of industrial  policy.  A concluding  section  discusses  some  caveats
and future research  and policy  tasks.
The goals of industrial policy
The term "industrial policy" evokes the image of Japanese bureaucrats of the 1960s or
1970s  vintage  picking  high growth sectors  ("winners")  and  guiding  industrial  firms  into those
sectors through financial incentives and an appeal to their sense of obligation to society.
Growth as the all-encompassing objective has great appeal. High growth appears to entail no
sacrifice. A rising  tide, as they say,  lifts all boats. Rapidly  growing  economies  will make the
most efficient  use of resources  and  be well  positioned  to withstand  unexpected  shocks.
The challenge  to the growth  mantra  has come from two fronts. First, based on Alwyn
Young's  (1995) research, Paul Krugman (1994) has argued that East Asian economic
performance is more a "myth" than "miracle." Rapid growth in East Asia was the outcome of
"blood, toil, sweat, and tears"-output  grew because of high rates of investment and not
scheduled  debt now or for the next couple  of years" (Wall  Street  Journal,  October 23, 1998).5
because  East Asians  were miraculously  able  to extract  more  output from a given  level  of
inputs. The numbers  themselves  and their  interpretation  have  been subject  to considerable
debate  (see the discussion  in IMF 1997,  box 9, pp. 82-83).5  A recent review  concludes  that
through  the 1980s,  East Asian  output growth  and productivity  growth  was considerably  higher
than in other parts of the world (IMF 1998,  chapter  3). In the 1990s,  however,  while  output
continued  to grow at high  rates, productivity  growth  in East Asia slowed  down considerably
reflecting  inefficient  use of capital. 6 Thus, output and efficiency  need  not grow  together.
Indeed,  rapid output growth can sometimes  lead  to the disregard  of prudent  investment
policies  and create inefficiencies:  "...businessmen  and financiers  alike  were likely  blinded  by
the success  of Thai corporates  over the last decades  that produced  impressive  economic
growth rates" (Alba,  Claessens,  and  Djankov  1998).
The collapse  of large parts of the corporate  sector in East Asia  provides  the second
challenge  to the virtues  of high  growth. The collapse  resulted  from some  of the same  features
that were only  recently  viewed  as strengths:  high  reliance  on bank debt, cross-shareholdings
among  corporates,  and close  relationships  between  business  and industry. As productivity
declined  in the 1990s,  the extend  of debt  (much of it short-term)  also rose, creating  high fixed
costs of debt  repayments  (Alba,  Claessens,  and Djankov  1998). At the same  time,  the ability
of the state to guide the corporate  sector diminished  as personalized  relationships  become
more common (Kim  1997 and  Lee 1997). Again,  the facts  and their interpretation  are
5When  the quality and  composition  of goods  being produced  are rapidly  changing,  as in East Asia, output and
productivity  growth  may be greatly  understated  (Nordhaus  1997). Collins  and Bosworth  (1996)  also conjecture
that there may exist  "threshold  effects." A certain level of capital accumulation  is necessary  before  the pool of
international  knowledge  can be tapped for productivity  growth.
6 The Malaysian  Government's  "National  Economic  Recovery  Program"  following  the crisis highlights  the
sharp fall in productivity  growth  from high levels  in the late 1980s  (Government  of Malaysia  1998). More  than
two-fifths  of Malaysian  Gross  Domestic  Product  was invested  between  1995  and 1997  with limited  increase  in
output on account  of the heavy  emphasis  on the property  sector  and other capital intensive  projects  with
expected  long-term returns. Falling  productivity  is also reflected  in sharply  declining  profit rates  throughout  the
region  (Alba, Claessens,  and Djankov  1998  and Claessens,  Djankov,  and Lang 1998).6
controversial.  In particular, some would argue that the collapse was unnecessary and resulted
mainly because of misguided policies imposed by the International Monetary Fund (i.e., Sachs).
It is sufficient to note that recent events have focused attention on systemic vulnerability as an
important consideration in the design of economic policy.
Efficiency, growth, and vulnerability-the  expanded set of industrial policy
objectives-are  considered in table 1. For many, good industrial policy is an open trade
regime, which fosters a competitive environment and, in particular, ensures efficient allocation
of resources (in line with a country's comparative advantage).  Though quintessentially
efficiency-enhancing,  an open trade regime is also conducive to growth where openness creates
access to the international pool of knowledge and hence facilitates the adoption of superior
production practices.  Where trade policy fails to provide the necessary discipline (because
goods and services are not traded), domestic competition policy creates the pressures that limit
wasteful allocation of societal resources. Competition from foreign investors may also raise the
quality of investments.
Despite the discipline from trade and domestic competition policies, managers of firms
may yet waste resources if they lack incentives to work in the interests of their stakeholders.
Efficient corporate structures are successful in mobilizing  resources and putting them to work
for the highest possible returns.  However, managers may also undertake substantial
investments (leading to high rates of output growth) but, lacking the knowledge or incentives,
may generate low returns for their stakeholders and render the economic system more
vulnerable to shocks. While the search for an "optimal" corporate structure may be illusory,
much attention has recently focused on policies that may lead managers to socially responsible
investment decisions. Rigidities in the labor market may also create poor investment decisions.7
Table 1: Objectives and instruments of industrial policy
Allocative  Investment  Growth  Vulnerability
efficiency  efficiency
Product market
Trade  policy  ?
Competition policy
Foreign  direct  investment  _1  ?
Capital  and  labor inputs  r  _
Corporate  structure/governance  _  _  _?  1  ?  _
Labor  market  norms  t  ?
Supporting  environment  l_l_l_l
Physical  infrastructure  t4
Education/technology  policy  t  4
Social  capital  1'  4-
Higher  environmental  standards  ?  l
Note: An up arrow (t)  indicates that appropriate policies create the potential for an increase
and a down arrow (4) indicates the potential for a decrease.  Note that 4-  is a desirable
objective only for vulnerability. A question mark (?) suggests that a relationship exists but is
poorly understood.  Spaces are left blank where policies and objectives are not directly related.
Finally, the supporting environment for industrial activity does not directly influence the
allocation and investment decisions but rather changes the entire economy's potential for
growth and its vulnerability. For example, superior infrastructure that reduces the cost of
moving people, goods, and information raises the growth potential while lowering the risks to
the economy. Protection of the air we breathe and the water we drink reduces risk but is
thought also to lower the growth potential; however, growth may not be sacrificed when
higher protection standards spur innovation leading to a more efficient use of resources.  While
the provision of an operating environment conducive to business is uncontroversial, the
methods of achieving the objective are undergoing considerable change.  Specifically, market
signals and private initiative are being increasingly  employed in the design and delivery of
support services and protection of the physical environment.8
The limits of trade policy
For many  observers,  trade policy  has been  the cornerstone  of East Asia's
industrialization  strategy. But the characterization  of East Asian  trade policy  varies  greatly.
For Alice  Amsden  (1989)  the policy  was proactive  with intent  to guide  firms,  especially  in
Korea, into high  growth areas. In contrast,  most proponents  of "openness"  interpret  the East
Asian  policy  as a hands-off  approach  of lowering  trade barriers  that spur  firms  to achieve
greater efficiency. Emphasizing  the latter perspective,  Jeffery  Sachs and  Andrew  Warner
(1995) determine  that rapidly  growing  Korea  has been  an "open" economy  since  1968. With
the failure  of countries  such  as India  to "opene  until recently,  Sachs and  Warner  find, not
surprisingly,  a close  association  between  "openness"  and growth.
Was  East Asia open?  And did "openness"  cause  growth? East Asia  illustrates  the
great difficulty  in measuring  the extent  to which  an economy  is open. In the Sachs and  Warner
analysis,  a key indicator  of an open  trade policy  is the lack of a significant  black market
premium  on the country's exchange  rate. T.N. Srinivasan,  in his comments  on the Sachs and
Warner  paper, and Susan  Collins  and Barry  Bosworth  (1996)  argue  that the black market
premium  depends  not only on trade policy  but on the overall  macroeconomic  prospects  and on
the liquidity  in the black exchange  markets. Low tariff  and non-tariff  barriers  on average  may
also deceive  if policy  is focused  on a few strategic  sectors (automobiles,  steel,  consumer
electronics). 7 Finally,  the Collins  and Bosworth  (1996)  raise  serious  questions  about the
statistical  association  between  "openness"  and growth. They  find with Sachs  and Warner a
strong  link between  "openness"  and growth in per capita  income  but little  association  between
"openness"  and growth of total factor productivity.  As Srinivasan  emphasizes,  a more open9
economy  should  primarily  enhance  efficiency.  Instead,  the Collins  and Bosworth  evidence
suggests  that if trade policy  worked  to raise  output in East Asia,  it did so by stimulating
greater investment.
Import  protection. An important  trade policy  tool for raising  investment  is protection
of domestic  producers  from import  competition.  As in other matters,  there is no East Asian
model  of import  protection. Robert  Wade (1993) documents  extensive  import  protection  in
Taiwan. But the aggressive  use of import  protection  as a tool of industrial  policy  really  is a
Korean story. In her provocative  book, Amsden  (1989)  argues  that the government
deliberately  set the prices  "wrong"  to foster  activities  with long-term  benefits  to the economy
but which  may  otherwise  not have  been  undertaken. Import  protection  in important  industrial
sectors such as automobiles,  steel, chemicals,  and heavy  machinery  was an instrument  for
fostering  growth and  is thus presented  by Amsden  as a constructive  and viable  development
strategy. Dornbusch  (1992)  though generally  skeptical  of import  protection  concedes  that in
some  countries  the protection  may  actually  have  worked  though state capacity  necessary  for
success  is uncommon  elsewhere.
In the current  international  climate  state-sponsored  industrialization  comes  under much
greater scrutiny  than was the case  in the past. Typically,  tariffs  are declining,  although  tariffs  in
Thailand  remain  surprisingly  high (table  2). Low overall  tariff rates mask  the protection
accorded  to specific  industries. Following  the recent financial  troubles,  the Indonesian
government  appears  to have scaled  back its protection  of the controversial  automobile  and
aircraft  projects.  The Indian  government's  continued  large stake in Maruti,  the largest
automobile  manufacturer,  is an anachronism,  which  has led to publicly  aired confrontation  with
its Japanese  partner. In part due to the intellectual  decline  of the import  protection,  protection
7On  account of these problems, in his comments on the Sachs and Warner paper, Stanley Fischer questions the10
survives, however, in other guises. As part of its "National Economic Recovery Program," the
Malaysian Government has recently announced a wide range of financial incentives to promote
its domestic automobile industry on account of its strong "linkage" effects.
Table 2: Tariff Rates in Large Developing Countries (%)
1984-87  1988-90  1991-1993  Post-Uruguay
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _R  o u n d
Indonesia  18.2  18.0  12.6  6.3
Brazil  50.2  28.4  14.7  11.7
China  29.2  29.2  30.6  16.6
India  90.0  62.4  42.6  30.9
Korea  20.2  11.3  10.0  7.7
Malaysia  14.7  11.5  11.2  6.4
Mexico  9.1  8.9  12.3  10.4
Thailand  26.9  38.0  36.9  26.1
Turkey  21.9  19.0  9.0  2.8
Source: World Bank. 1998. "Indonesia: Strengthening International Competitiveness."
Processed. The World Bank, Washington D.C.
Also, Michael Finger (1997) notes, "safety valves" emerge to circumvent the discipline
imposed under international agreements to reduce trade barriers.  "Voluntary export restraints"
by Japanese auto producers at the height of their ascendancy in the U.S. market gave much
breathing room to U.S. automakers.  By controlling the quantities sold, a defacto  cartelization
of the U.S. market was permitted allowing  U.S. producers to sell larger quantities at stable or
higher prices (Krishna 1989).  8  Because they reduced competition, voluntary export restraints
were always viewed by academic economists with disfavor and over time most of these
arrangements have been wound up.
classification  of several  countries  as "openr'  or "closed."
8 The  U.S.  automobile  industry  is stronger  today  than  it was  at the  onset  of  the voluntary  export  restraints.
Many  Japanese  innovations,  such  as "lean"  production,  have  been  imnitated  by  U.S.  producers.11
Another  safety  valve  highlighted  by Finger  is antidumping  duties. The share  of trade
directly  affected  by antidumping  duties has not been  large;  however,  Finger  argues  that such
duties  have  had a "chilling"  effect  on trade. In other words,  the prospect-and  threat-of
duties being  imposed  has led to scaling  back  of exports  by developing  country  exporters,
thereby  affording  protection  to developed  country  producers. The threat of duties  being
imposed,  Finger  argues  is high  because  the definition  of antidumping  is always  fuzzy  and
experience  suggests  a high probability  of success  in persuading  national  authorities  that
protection  is  justified. Antidumping  duties also  encourage  producers  across  borders  to collude
and so can be more expensive  to the economy  than straight  import  duties. Antidumping
actions  by developed  nations  were on the decline,  but have  been on the rise once again  since
1995,  with a sharp projected  rise in 1998  to almost  300 cases  instituted  worldwide  compared
with about 225 in 1997 (The  Economist,  November  7-13, 1998).9  In an important
development,  developing  countries  are increasingly  resorting  to protection  through
antidumping  measures;  most such  actions  are against  other developing  countries.
Export  promotion.  Export promotion  is viewed  as more  benign  than import  protection
(World  Bank 1993). Export promotion,  however,  potentially  suffers  from  the same  rent-
seeking  behavior  as does import  protection. Export  promotion  instruments  are thought  to
have  worked in East Asia. But even  if that was the case-and  the evidence  as reported  below
is ambiguous-we have an identification  problem. Both import  protection  and export
promotion  worked to some  extent  in East Asia;  both import  protection  and export promotion
9 "European  Union  steelmakers  are set to launch dumping  complaints  over steel  imports  from up to eight Asian,
African  and eastern  European  countries-mirroring demands  from US counterparts  for action to stem a flood
of cheap imports."  Financial Times  November  11, 1998.12
have  had less success  outside  East Asia. 10 Thus what works is East Asia  in its incarnation
before July 1997  and not necessarily  either  import  protection  or export promotion.
The evidence  on export subsidies  has three components.  First, in most countries  export
subsidies  have  been abused  through  overinvoicing,  falsification  of shipments,  and lobbying  for
ad hoc subsidization  to benefit  the least  competitive  exporters  (see Rodrik 1993  on the
experience  in Bolivia,  Kenya,  India,  and Turkey)." 1 Economic  theory has provided  no easy
guidance  on the design  of subsidies. Should  they  be tailored  to sectoral  or project
requirements  to help  overcome  specific  constraints  to increased  exports (as in East Asia) or
should  they  be set at uniform  levels  to limit  lobbying  for special  dispensations  (as was the
intent  in Bolivia  and  Kenya)? The Bolivian  and Kenyan  scams  show  that uniformity  does not
reduce  the potential  for abuse. The possibility  that selective  subsidies  generated  some  benefits
in East Asia once again  suggests  that it is East Asia  that worked rather  than the subsidies.
Second,  even  where  would-be  exporters  have  not exploited  the system,  the impact  of
subsidies  on export growth  has been  limited. 12 Rodrik (1993)  examines  the trends in export
subsidies  and in manufactured  goods exports. He finds  that export subsidies  showed  little
change  in years  prior to the "boom" in East Asian  exports. Thus the export  targets set seem  to
have  been at least as important-or  more so-than  the subsidies.  Rodrik's evidence  is
consistent  with other recent  work on the determinants  of exports. Mark Roberts  and Jim
Tybout  (1992)  show  that because  exporting  has high sunk  costs, producers  do not freely  move
10  To the extent export  subsidies  worked  in Brazil during  the 1970s, they  were also accompanied  by a
relatively  successful  import substitution  (Nogues  1990).
11Among  the more  egregious  anecdotes  is that of a Kenyan  exporter  licensed  to export  gold and  jewelry. All
exports  turned out to be to fictitious  buyers. But the cost to the Kenyan  treasury  was severe. That one firm
received  cash subsidy  equal to five  percent of all exports. Kenya's  export policy  had moved  from "the Scylla  of
incentive-blunting  diligence  to the Charbdes  of corrupt  generosity' (Rodrik  1993,  p. 25).
12 Production  subsidies,  rather than those directed  towards  exports,  may have fared  even worse. Krugman
(1996)  analyzes  the overall  impact  of subsidies  for steel and semiconductors  for Japan and finds some  evidence
that these  contributed  to overproduction  and subsequent  gluts in the market  which did little to benefit  the
domestic  producers.13
in and out of exporting  activity. In other  words, having  committed  to exports  they persist  in
doing  so till  conditions  change  to an extent  that the option value  of staying  exporters  falls
significantly  inducing  a shift  away  from exports. In Egan and Mody (1992)  and Mody  and
Yilmaz  (1997a)  persistence  is seen to arise  from long-term  relationships  with international
buyers. These  buyers  invest  in developing  country  exporters  by providing  continuing  technical
and marketing  information.  Hence  a virtuous  circle  of growing  exports,  superior  "reputation,"
and increased  competencies  emerges. For these  reasons,  even  though price elasticities  in
export demand  functions  tend  to be in the range of unity,  only a small  fraction  of the large
growth of East Asian  exports can be attributed  to the slower  growth of East Asian  export
prices relative  to those of their competitors.
Finally,  recognizing  the importance  of non-price  factors  in the development  of export
markets,  supporting  measures  complimented  export subsidies  in East Asia. Of special
importance  were detailed  sectoral  and firm-specific  export  targets that were monitored  at the
highest  levels  of government  (Westphal  1990). Upon the achievement  of these targets
depended  the access  to government  favors,  especially  subsidized  credit. Thus, a carrot-and-
stick policy  was followed  (Stiglitz  1996).  In addition,  East Asian  governments  generated
benefits  for all exporters  through  agencies  that developed  new  markets  and testing and
standards  organizations  certified  product quality  to enhance  the "reputation"  of exports
(Dahlman  1994  and Stiglitz  1996).'3
In sum,  the evidence  suggests  that East Asian  policymakers  did not passively  rely on
lower trade barriers to send the right price signals. They used complimentary  measures to
foster active participation in international trade.  High trade intensity was encouraged and the
13 There  is a story  told  about  the  sale  of the  first  batch  of bicycles  from  Taiwan.  Certain  defects  likely  to cause
injury  were  discovered  after  the  bicycles  arrived  in the  United  States.  The  Taiwanese  government  paid  for  their
recall  and  replacement  of  these  bicycles  on  the grounds  that  country  reputation  was  involved.14
benefits of increased foreign trade were real enough (see Pack 1994 and Pack and Page 1994);
but an open trade regime was clearly considered insufficient-and,  in some instances,
inappropriate.
Industrial conglomerates  or crony capitalism?
Following the recent East Asian crisis, special attention has been focussed on
government-business relationships in the region. Once the object of admiration in
characterizations such as Japan Inc., Korea Inc., or Malaysia Inc., these relationships have
become suspect and in popular commentary a contributory cause of the crisis. Of the legacies
of old-style East Asian industrial policy the one that is most seen to have a bearing on the
recent crisis-either  directly or through creating a "zone of vulnerability"-is  the extent of
"cronyism" prevalent in many countries of the region.
For industrial ventures, the term "crony capitalism" seems to have come into popular
usage in the context of special favors granted to particular industrial groups under President
Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines during the late-1970s and the early 1980s. It seemed
evident then to most observers of the Philippines  that such special dispensation was both
iniquitous and inefficient. However, evidence from other countries in the region could be read
as indicating success. Starting even earlier, the Korean government-following  the example
set by Japan-had  embarked upon a policy of actively promoting special groups (known as
chaebols).  Over a period of about three decades the chaebols did very well for themselves
and for the country-until  several of them folded up in the recent crisis. Crony capitalism also
prospered along with Indonesia once again till the recent crisis hit, leading to a reassessment of
their role.15
Today,  in the wake of the East Asian  crisis  with attention  focussed  on factors
contributing  to poor governance,  it is easy  and, perhaps,  appropriate  to be critical  of industrial
conglomerates  sponsored  by the government.  Close  relationships  between  big  business  and
government  can be used productively  or can  be the source  of wasteful  corruption.  Korean
authorities  chose explicitly  to foster  conglomerates  to conserve  entrepreneurial  resources,
which  they believed  to be in short supply. Such  positive  economic  justifications  of
conglomerates  are found in the economic  literature  (Oliver  Williamson  1975)  and in the
writings  of Korean  observers  (Leroy  Jones 1987). But diversified  big business  houses  may
derive  sustenance  mainly  through  their superior  ability  to lobby  for industrial  permits,  cheap
credit, and other  favors. Pankaj  Ghemawat  and Tarun  Khanna  (1997)  find  that following
Indian economic  liberalization  in the 1990s,  the degree  of diversification  rapidly  declined  in
select  groups. In Indonesia,  though government-business  relations  shored  up investment  and
output, the nature  of the relationships  have  been seen as most liable  to fall off on to the wrong
side  of the knife's edge. Chinese  businessmen  took on as partners  military  officers  with
political  links:  this facilitated  licenses  and contracts,  the military  partners also developed  a
stake  in the growth of the enterprises.  But, Campos  and Root (1996) point  out that the system
"thrives  on the lack of predictability  of and transparency  in the regulatory  environment,"  a
condition  which  they  believe  is ultimately  inimical  to growth.
It could be that conglomerate  firms  did serve  a virtuous  function  in some  parts of East
Asia in the 1970s  and 1980s,  but are now  unnecessary  or even  harmful. In a comparison  of
Taiwan  (China)  and  Korea written  in the mid-  1980s,  I showed  that by most measures  of
economic  development,  Korea was following  Taiwan  (China)  with a lag of about a decade
(Mody 1990). However,  Korean  chaebols  were making  impressive  strides  resulting  in faster
Korean growth accompanied  by investment  in increasingly  more  sophisticated  products and a16
global marketing reach that was laying the basis for future growth.  The price of higher growth
was greater vulnerability: Korean firms were subject to sharper downtums and setbacks.  Some
Taiwanese firms clearly saw the merits the Korean strategy. Despite the folklore of "small is
beautiful in Taiwan," and with direct and indirect governmental support, firms such as Acer
(the computer mass manufacturer) and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (the
international joint-venture for chip production) were adopting mass production and marketing
techniques to establish themselves as significant  international players. Thus, over time some
degree of convergence occurred in the industrial structures of the two economies as Taiwanese
firms grew in size and established their own brand names while the sprawling Korean
conglomerates rationalized their business.
The successful harnessing of industrial conglomerates, where it did occur, resulted
from a particular political conjuncture not commonly found. Peter Evans (1993) describes the
state in East Asia as possessing an "embedded autonomy."  The autonomy permits the
government to set national goals and to discipline  private sector behavior. However, the state
is also embedded in the broader social and economic milieu through personal ties between
government officials and leaders of the private sector.  This delicate balance between personal
relationships, which foster information flows and create trust, and autonomy which allows the
government to pursue a broad-based social agenda is, according to Evans, the key to East
Asian success.  East Asia is thus distinguished not only from predatory states such as Zaire
(where the state is rapaciously autonomous) but also from intermediate states, such as India
and Brazil, where neither autonomy nor embeddedness prevail.
However, East Asia itself may have lost its ability to balance on the knife's edge.  In
Korea, for example, the state's autonomy was compromised as the economy grew rapidly, and
business groups acquired increased political influence. Korean authorities attempted17
unsuccessfully from the mid-1980s to restrict favors to conglomerates, demand greater
specialization in their activities, and discipline  them through competition policy laws (Kim
1997 and Lee 1997).  The ongoing Korean crisis may serve to break the inertia (e.g., the recent
takeover by Hyundai of Kia, the troubled motor company).' 4 In Thailand, similarly,  industrial
conglomerates powered the growth process but are under intense scrutiny for their governance
methods following their recent collapse (Alba, Claessens, and Djankov 1998).
In today's  context, the viability of a strategy of promoting large industrial firms has
been undermined by the high associated economic and political risks.  As such, while the
strategy was an option in the context of East Asian development, it is no longer tenable. To
enhance investment efficiency,  policymakers need to rely on a new set of corporate governance
mechanisms that require reduced reliance on bank debt, more transparency in operations and
accounting, and greater shareholder rights (Stephen Prowse 1998).  Which is not to say, as
with import protection, that governments will cease to promote national champions. In China,
which is relatively insulated from international trends, the attraction of "holding companies"
has been significant,  as has been the case in certain parts of Eastern Europe (Anjali Kumar
1993). More importantly, Khanna and Krishna Palepu (1997) remind us of the continued
economic rationale of conglomerates, especially where capital and information markets
function poorly.  While active promotion of conglomerates may be inappropriate, their
characterization as per se a detrimental force, and hence to be severely constrained, may also
be unjustified.
14 Though the government  has urged swapping  of business  lines to achieve  specialization,  the five largest
conglomerates  have,  in their most recent  move,  agreed to mergers  of businesses  in semiconductors,
petrochemicals,  aerospace,  rolling stock,  ship engines,  and power  generation. For example,  Hyundai
Electronics  and LG Semicon,  the second  and third largest semiconductor  producers,  will merge. Each will thus
retain an interest in semiconductors  (instead  of specializing)  and the net effect  will be of reducing  "excessive"18
Provision of non-tradable inputs: an unfinished domestic agenda:
The efficient supply of non-tradable inputs is critical both to increase national
productivity and to participate in international commerce.  I focus here on physical
infrastructure.15 The economnic  importance of these inputs arises not only because they cannot
purchased from other nations but also because they are associated with strong economies of
scale. The govermment's role has changed from direct provision to setting the terms of
procurement of service, defining the regulatory rules of the game, and ensuring consumer
protection.
East Asian emphasis on infrastructure was sound.6 The sustained commitment to
high-quality infrastructure in East Asia was the product of a long-range vision-to  maintain the
region's  competitiveness in export markets, to attract foreign investment to the region, and to
support more balanced social development.  Compared with an average infrastructure
investment of 4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) among all developing countries,
investment in East Asia rarely fell below 4 percent of GDP and was often higher, reaching 7 or
8 percent in several years (World Bank 1994). On occasion, the commitment to high levels of
investment implied a willingness  to undertake bold ventures, often amounting to gambles, in
competition  (Financial  Times,  September  4, 1998).
15Many East Asian economies  also invested  extensively  in technological  upgrading  (Dahlman 1994,  Goldman
et.al. 1997,  Lall 1998). Following  the Japanese  lead, technology  dissemination  institutions  catering specially  to
small  and medium  enterprises  (such  as the very  effective  Hong Kong  Productivity  Council)  were set up
throughout  the region. In addition,  incentives  raised private  research  and development  to high levels,
especially  in Korea. Finally, a strong  emphasis  on technical  education  produced  large numbers  of engineers.
According  to one estimate  (Lall 1998),  the absolute  number  of scientists  and engineers  in Korea  (118,000)  is
about the same  as in India (128,000). While  these  measures  have undoubtedly  contributed  to East Asian
growth,  the challenge  facing  most developing  countries  today is provide  technological  support  in a more
market-oriented  way. In this regard,  the external linkages  that proved  to be conduits  of knowledge  may have
more  relevance  than publicly  provided  technical  support.
16 The discussion  on East Asian infrastructure  here is based on Mody (1997b).19
high-profile infrastructure projects. In all East Asian economies, the drive toward nurturing
international commerce and investment made telecommunications,  ports, and airports critical
to the overall economic strategy.  Despite initial East Asian advantage in power and
communications over other developing countries, growth in these sectors substanially  widened
the gap (table 3).  Growth was especially rapid in Korea and Thailand. Although Chile had a
more advanced infrastructure in 1970, Malaysia's infrastructure had surged ahead by the early
1990s-despite  the fact that Chile is Latin America's star performer and in the vanguard of
market-oriented reforms.
Why did this top-driven process, mediated by elaborate planning mechanisms, succeed
in delivering infrastructure of generally sound quality? Why, instead, were more mistakes not
made? Why did the coordination function work when similar attempts in other economies have
generally led to poor results? The answers are found in three complementary hypotheses. First,
the goal of infrastructure development was simple: the emphasis was on production and trade-
related infrastructure to support econormic  growth; equity considerations and environmental
concerns received less attention, no doubt with costs that must now be dealt with.  Second, the
number of competing "voices" or competing claims were limited, allowing the focus on growth
to proceed. Third, the elixir of growth itself is a powerful reinforcement mechanism, where
positive outcomes engender socially responsible behavior.
New infrastructure challenges require new skills.  Governments in East Asia, as
elsewhere, are also increasingly  realizing that the private sector must participate more heavily
in infrastructure.  While the East Asian emphasis on the importance of infrastructure remains,
the methods of delivery are changing rapidly. New and sophisticated skills are required as
governments move away from being operators to regulators and facilitators (see papers in
Kohli, Mody, and Walton 1997).Table 3: Provision  of infrastructure:  East Asia races ahead
Electric  power  generation  Telephone  connections  Paved  roads
Country  (millions  of kilowaffs  per 100  persons)  (number  of  connections  per  100  persons)  (meters  per 100  persons)
1970  1992  Annual  growth  rate,  1975  1993  Annual  growth  rate,  1970  1990  Annual  growth  rate,
1970-92  (percent)  197543  (percent)  1970-90  (percent)
Hong  Kong  34.0  154.0  13.4  6.7  51.0  11.9  23.0  26.0  0.6
Japan  66.1  165.4  8.0  30.8  46.8  2.4  146.1  630.7  7.6
Korea,  Rep.  of  8.8  61.7  17.6  4.0  37.8  13.3  11.5  79.9  10.2
Malaysia  8.7  36.0  12.5  1.6  12.6  12.2  143.1  156.1  0.4
Singapore  31.0  126.8  12.4  12.3  43.5  7.3  58.3  101.9  2.8
Thailand  3.7  22.1  16.0  0.6  3.7  10.9  27.0  70.9  4.9
Brazil  11.8  35.8  9.7  2.2  7.5  6.9  53.1  108.4  3.6
Chile  22.9  35.4  3.7  3.0  11.0  7.5  79.1  83.4  0.3
Ghana  7.7  7.5  -0.2  0.3  0.3  -0.7  53.6  55.5  0.2
India  3.0  9.2  9.9  0.2  0.9  7.6  59.3  89.4  2.0
Source:  Ashoka  Mody  ed. 1997.  "lnfrastrastructure  Strategies  in  East  Asia: the  untold  story."  Washington  D.C.:  The  World  Bank.20
*  Sector structure designed to enhance competition.  Experience from Chile shows that
following privatization, incumbent firms can acquire significant  market power, limiting the
benefits of privatization. Regulatory reforms to facilitate interconnection in
telecommunications and "third-party access" of transmission in electric power and gas
sectors are preconditions to a sound competitive regime.
*  Contracting.  For many infrastructure services, it is necessary to award the rights to
provide services. Conducting a fair competition and negotiating the terms of contract are
major challenges. Required design and negotiating skills are substantial.  The sophisticated
process for the award of airwaves for mobile telephony and other services in the U.S. was
viewed as a great success when bidders committed to pay large fees for the rights to those
airwaves. However, several contracts have unraveled, as the winning bidders have been
unable to fulfil their commitment.
*  Finance.  With infrastructure investment at around 4 percent of GDP, even a three-
quarters share of private investment in infrastructure implies only a 3 percent of GDP
requirement to finance private infrastructure. For most countries this should not pose a
significant  problem since domestic savings are typically much higher. However, domestic
financial institutions have typically been unable to channel the resources into long-lived
assets prone to regulatory risks. As a consequence, much of private infrastructure has been
financed with international funding even though revenues are in domestic currency.  The
sudden and large increase in domestic currency obligations in the wake of sharp currency
devaluations has hit projects in Mexico and in East Asia during the two recent currency
crises.
The challenges inherent in gearing traditional public administrations to fulfil  this new role in
facilitating private investment in infrastructure are enormous.  For East Asia, the challenge may21
be greater than elsewhere.  Despite  the tradition  of strong  institutions  that would  normally  be a
source of inertia,  East Asian economies  have,  in the past, displayed  an ability  to adapt  to
infrastructure  needs  as they developed.  That ability  will  be tested severely,  paradoxically,
because  of the very achievements  in installing  a largely  successful  delivery  mechanism.  To
reorient  that system  will  require  both political  capital  and skilled  administration.
Taking  the place  of domestic  policy  are global  rules:  an incomplete  consensus?
The guiding  leitmotif  of the new emerging  consensus  on industrial  policy  is greater
competition.  Dismantling  of entry  barriers  and the establishment  of antitrust  legislation  and
enforcement  are direct efforts  to increase  the potential  for competition.  A more liberal  and
internationally  uniform  regime  for the flow  of foreign  direct  investment  is in the spirit  of
facilitating  greater competition.  Greater  controversy  surrounds  the measures  to limit  "unfair
competition." A tighter intellectual  property  regime  has been endorsed  and is being
implemented  worldwide,  though under somewhat  different  timetables  to allow  for differing
country  circumstances.  The most contentious  issues  relate  to the creation  of uniform
international  standards  for the environment  and for workers. The trend, however,  is towards
an increasing  convergence  on "minimum"  standards.
Domestic  competition  policy. The commitment  to domestic  competition  policy  has
varied  greatly  across  countries  and across  time. The current  emphasis  on competition  is in
contrast  to objectives  and  practice  in East Asia. As Stiglitz  (1996)  has noted, striking  the right
balance  between competition  and cooperation  was an important  concern  for East Asian
policymakers.  Economic  theory concedes  that less  than full competition  may  stimulate  growth
where firms  with market power  use their  profits  to innovate  and hence move  the technological
frontier.  Maintaining  a dynamic  tension  between competition  and  "collusionr  was,22
consequently,  an important  feature  of Japanese  industrial  policy  (Yamamura  1986).  17 In the
United States,  the present  concern  with ensuring  competition  (e.g., antitrust  case  Microsoft
and the closer scrutiny  of mergers)  follows  low priority  accorded  to antitrust  starting  in the
Reagan  administration.
Competition  has been  boosted  by reducing  bureaucratic  restraints  to competition.
Licensing  requirements  to operate have  been eased significantly  in India,  for example. The
dismantling  of restrictions  to competition  is an important  condition  of the support  being
extended  by international  institutions  to the "crisis"  countries." 8
The greater challenge  to competition  policy  lies in the identification  of real-rather
than  bureaucratically  generated-market power  and enforcement  of decisions  to limit
dominance. Contractual  relationships  between  firms  may  reflect  measures  to increase
efficiency,  which  is socially  desirable.  However,  these same  relationships  can create entry
barriers  for other firms.  Differences  of opinion  arise,  for example,  with regard to long-term
vertical  supply  agreements  and price  discrimination  (do these reinforce  market  power or are
they  principally  efficiency  enhancing).  While  sharp characterizations  are difficult,  the European
competition  policy  laws regard certain  contractual  arrangements  as  per se anticompetitive,  the
U.S. laws require  a more  tailored,  or rule of reason,  analysis  to each case. These differences
arising  from the different  histories  create a challenge  for harmonization  of competition  policy.
International harmonization of competition policy.  The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas
merger  brought  to the fore the debate  on intemational  competition  policy. U.S. authorities,
under whose  jurisdiction  these firms  ostensibly  operate,  had approved  the merger. However,
the European  Commission  questioned  the appropriateness  of the merger  on account  of its
1 7 On the limited development of competition policy in East and South East Asia, see Rong-I Wu and Yun-
Peng Chu (1998).
Government-supported cartels, price controls, entry and exit controls, exclusive licensing, and public sector23
iEaot  on Airbus Industries.  The main concession required by the European Union
eompetition commissioner, Karel Van Miert, was the abandonment of 20-year exclusive supply
.ontracts to three U.S. airlines  (American,  Continental,  and Delta). U.S. antitrust  authorities
an.d.  the European  Commission  clearly  had different  views on the anti-competitive  effects  of
,sngterm supply  contracts.  Was the brinkmanship  displayed  a reflection  of long-standing
.va-Iy  between  Boeing  and Airbus  or does the case  illustrate  a more widespread  problem? 19
General  agreement  exists  on the benefits  of international  competition  is
ecomrnmunications.  International long-distance telephony continues widely to be the preserve
of government monopolies. Recent agreements within the WTO are designed to increase
com.petition  and create common standards for regulation. The U.S. Federal Communications
'cxomnission  has proposed  sharply reducing  the large  payments made  to developing  country
1ecom  monopolies for the privilege of completing calls in those countries.  In an editorial
oo  ment, the Financial Times (August 12, 1997), normally a critic of such unilateral action,
concludes that "the benefits of a more efficient market for international calls" following from
the FCC action "will be felt across the world."
As with other issues on the "deep integration" agenda, a great diversity of government
actions (e.g., procurement rules, aid to small and medium firms, cooperative industrial R&D)
influence the extent of competition.  Judging the influence  of each of these to determine
Žnticompetitive  actions and behavior will be no easy task (Jacquemin 1994). F.M. Scherer
(  994) has proposed a sequenced transition to an international competition policy. Beginning
as a forum  for the exchange  of information  in the early  stages,  an international  body  would
dominance  are under review  in Indonesia  and other  crisis countries.
19 Joel Klein (1998) claims  that the problem  is a serious  one. He states that in the last year the United States
authorities  have imposed  $200 million  in fines in "criminal  antitrust cases  involving  international  cartels."24
gradually  acquire  teeth until it was in a position  to define  international  standards  for domestic
competition  policy  and also  to arbitrate  on disputes  between  countries.
Interestingly,  the United  States  has been  lukewarm  to the idea  of an international
competition  policy.  Joe Klein  (1998),  the assistant  attorney  general  for the antitrust  division  in
the U.S. Department  of Justice,  argues  that it would  be inappropriate  to supplant  the authority
of the domestic  system  by international  directives:  "... decisions  taken by competition
authorities  would plainly  stray on to delicate  territory,  such as second-guessing  the exercise  of
prosecutorial  discretion  and  judicial  decision-making."  The appeal  to sovereignty  in this case
is intriguing  because  in most other matters  (e.g., intellectual  property  protection  and the setting
of environmental  and labor standards),  the U.S. has viewed  a higher  international  authority  as
desirable.
Current  trends, therefore,  suggest  an increasing  emphasis  on "an international  culture
of sound  antitrust  enforcement,  built on the basis  of shared  experience,  bilateral  cooperation
and technical  assistance  to countries  just starting  down  this road." Also,  "mutual  assistance
agreements"  will be increasingly  used to share  evidence. A special  challenge  is to bring  the
sometimes  arbitrary  national  antidumping  proceedings  within  the purview  of an international
antitrust  regime. For most developing  countries  this will  imply  building  organizations  and
skills  in an policy  area  where significant  differences  in international  practice  continue  to exist.
Foreign  direct investment. The wariness  towards foreign  investment  has declined  or
even disappeared. The concern  now is the opposite:  of excessive  and  wasteful  competition  in
the effort  to attract investment.  To that end rules are being  discussed  in different  multilateral
fora on the harmonization  of rules  that reduce  discrimination  against  foreign  investors  and, at
the same  time,  limit  competition  for the investment.25
The empirical evidence is, however, stubbornly unhelpful in making the case for greater
foreign investment. Though some studies show a positive growth or productivity impulse from
foreign investment, most continue to show little or no effect (for a recent review, see
Blomstrom and Kokko 1997).  Also, foreign investment may spur domestic competition only
to a limited extent.  For example, Malaysia's high levels of foreign investment are limited to
key manufacturing sectors with no competitive impact on large parts of the economy, such as
financial services and infrastructure delivery.
A levelplaying-field  or "a race to the bottom?"  While intellectual property protection
is desirable to stimulate innovation, the rapid diffusion of knowledge (once the innovation is in
place) raises world welfare. The diffusion of knowledge to poor countries has special merit
(particularly where it relates to basic needs such as food and health). Weak protection of
intellectual property in developing countries was not seen as a major threat until the mid-1980s
when studies of questionable methodology by U.S. government agencies determined that the
matter was indeed a serious one.  The issue is now moot since most developing countries have
signed on to uniforrm  standards negotiated during the course of the Uruguay Round and
backed by sanctions available under the WTO. 20
The debate on uniformity of standards has moved on two other contentious areas:
environmental and labor.  The phrase "race to the bottom" applies especially in these contexts.
The fear is that countries with lax standards will gain "unfairly" as investors seek these
"havens" with low costs of environmental compliance and cheap labor.  Those against common
standards argue that diversity is a desirable objective in and of itself and, absent commonly
agreed unifying  principles, setting universal standards is improper (Bhagwati 1996); moreover,
20 The  concem  has moved  in the opposite  direction.  Intellectual  wealth  embodied  in historical  traditions,
especially  as regards  the use of herbs and other indigenous  materials  for medicinal  purposes,  may  be patented
by aggressive  international  companies.  Many  view this as an unfair appropriation  of knowledge.26
diversity is the source of differences in comparative advantage that generates international
trade (Krugman 1997).
Two studies show little evidence of investor preference for locations with lax
standards.  Levinson (1996) examines investors' stated intentions as well as trade and
investment flows to find that low standards at best have a marginal influence in some of the
more toxic industries. Multinational firms find it easier to use the same techniques in
developing countries as they do in their advanced home countries because they have greater
experience with their home techniques. Moreover, the prospects of more stringent standards in
the future makes early investment in pollution control equipment cost effective, by reducing the
need to replace equipment at a later date.  Rodrik's (1996) findings on labor standards are
similar. Higher labor standards do result in higher costs of labor.  There is also weak evidence
that lax labor standards are associated with more labor-intensive exports.  However, there is no
evidence that higher labor standards deter foreign investment-if  anything, countries with low
standards deter foreign investors.  These findings are consistent with other evidence that
foreign investors are concerned about labor quality (Dasgupta, Mody, and Sinha 1997); where
labor standards are low, labor quality is unlikely to be high.
But as with intellectual property, the march towards common standards in
environmental and labor matters seems inevitable. Particularly for labor standards, the
convergence is being driven by "humanitarian" concerns. 2'  Virginia Leary (1996,p.220)
concludes that most "serious advocates, as well as opponents, of a social clause" agree that:
"... certain limitations on trade (or withdrawal of trade benefits) are justifiable in particular
circumstances (failure to protect intellectual property, various exceptions listed in Article XX
of the GATT), and that freedom of association, prohibition of child labor, and discrimination in
21  Commenting on child labor, World Bank (1997) says: "International concern, and interest in action is
growing, as evidenced by the Amsterdam Child Labor Conference in February 1997 and the Oslo Conference in
October.  The time is right for all concerned organizations, including the Bank, to do more."27
employment  are fundamental  human  rights  standards  which  have  been nearly  universally
accepted  and should  be upheld  regardless  of economic  status."
In this view,  harmonization  of detailed  work conditions  should  be pursued  through  the "moral
persuasion"  of the International  Labor Organization  (LO), but failure  to adhere  should  not be
subject  to trade sanctions.  However,  violations  of "fundamental  workers' rights" should,  for
moral reasons,  result in limitations  on trade. In its recent paper  on child  labor,  the World Bank
(1997) concedes  the complexity  of distinguishing  between  acceptable  and unacceptable  child
labor and proposes  lending  and technical  assistance  to alleviate  the problem. Provisions  in loan
agreements  that require  the borrower  to "undertake  to enforce  its laws" are appropriate  under
the Bank's charter (World  Bank 1997).  Rodrik  (1996)  proposes  the mechanism  of public
hearings  in which  opposing  interests  would  testify  on whether  fundamental  values  are indeed
being  violated  in the production  of the suspect exports.
Thus,  the trends outlined  imply  new skills  within  governments  to deal with more  their
complex  mandates. Instead  of directing  private  business  into particular  lines  of activity
through a variety  of incentives,  the task at hand is establish  transparent  rules and to enforce
them. Though  apparently  more straightforward  than selective  incentives,  setting  and enforcing
competition  rules for industry  (and more so, as discussed  above,  for infrastructure)  is
technically  challenging  and also requires  sectoral  expertise. If anything,  the greater sensitivity
of this new generation  of policies  to the different  industry  conditions  and forms of market
structure  probably  imply  a greater  level of industry  specific  knowledge  for regulators  to be
effective. At the same  time,  the interface  between  business  and ethics is assuming  greater
prominence.28
Concluding observations
The evolving  consensus-though incomplete-implies  a reduced  role 6r an acti..Mst
government.  There also is some consensus on the role that remains. The corvegence  Gm.
in this paper relates  not only  to ideas  but also  to their application  in countries  at very difr: 
economic  levels  of development.
The new generation  of policies  emphasizing  greater  competition  and a 'level piaying  -
field" are implicitly  thought to require less governmental action and hence a smaller  araouu. o-l
governmental  human  capital. However,  there is no basis for such an assumption.  Competuion
policy,  for example,  requires  expertise  on a wide variety  of sectors. Compounding  the
problems  is the fuzziness  in the rules of competition  policy. If implementing  a I0 perc-.it
export subsidy  is difficult,  imagine  the challenge  of determining  whether a firm  is exerc  isig
market power  or restraining  trade. This  is not to deny  the relevance  and importance  of a good
competition  policy  but rather to point out that the prospect of the government  stepping  back r
of government  agencies  acting  with reduced  discretion  may  not be so realistic  after all.
To keep  up with the growing  demands  of competing  in the intemational  economy,  Em:
Asian  governments  and  their hitherto  sophisticated  bureaucracies  will need  to shift  gears and
acquire  new skills. This may  be the time to consolidate  the gains  from  the rapid  trade-led
growth by focusing  on creating  a stronger  incentive  structure  for the efficient  utilization  of
resources.  Their  traditions,  however,  are an asset and a handicap. While  the potential  for
adaptation  to the new circumstances  exists,  the inertia  from  the old and tested ways of doing
things  may  hold them back. Among  other  developing  countries,  China  may  have  the
wherewithal  and  the insulation  from international  pressures  to stimulate  growth  with old-style
East Asian  instruments. However,  China's  experiments  with regional  growth centers  may  have
wider applications.29
On any contentious  subject,  appeal  to empirical  evidence  is of little help. Did import
protection  "work" in East Asia? How effective  were the different  export promotion
instruments?  Did the various  East Asian  policies  complement  or work against  each other? Or
on more recent concerns:  is there a "right"  balance  between competition  and cooperation?
How will harmonization  of investment  codes  redirect  the flows  of foreign  investment?  Where
evidence  does exist,  it seems  to play  only a limited  role in formulating  policies  (environment
and labor standards  make  virtually  no difference  to trade and  investment  flows  but the pressure
to impose  uniform  standards  and use trade sanctions  as the enforcing  mechanism  continues
nevertheless).  Perhaps,  then, this is the most telling  commentary  on the swings  in industrial
policy:  industrial  policy  will  be what industrial  policy  will  be. The story is yet to unfold:  look
out for the next consensus.30
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